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SUZANNA SHERRY
LEE v WEISMAN:
PARADOX REDUX
For more than two decades, the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence was "at war with" its Free Exercise jurispru-
dence.1  In recent years, however, two major decisions-
Employment Division v Smith2 and Lee v Weisman3 -have effected a
significant shift in our religion clause jurisprudence. In this article
I will suggest that, considered together, these two decisions have
merely replaced one form of incoherence with another. In particu-
lar, I will suggest that either decision could be justified alone-and
indeed, that either standing alone would be an improvement on
the Court's previous religion clause doctrine-but that together
they make little sense.
The twenty-year tension between the Court's interpretations of
the two religion clauses was especially acute in the context of spe-
Suzanna Sherry is Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law,
University of Minnesota.
AuTHoR's NOTE: I am very grateful to Daniel Farber, Douglas Laycock, Michael McCon-
nell, and Michael Paulsen for their detailed critical comments on an earlier draft of this
essay. They are among the most helpful critiques I have ever received, and the essay is a
stronger piece as a result of their comments. As should be apparent from the text, however,
their kindness in offering assistance should not be taken as agreement with any of my
arguments.
' Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent
Developments, 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 943, 947 (1986). See also Jesse H. Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U Pitt L Rev 673, 674 (1980);
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60
Geo Wash L Rev 685, 695 (1992); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U Chi L Rev 308, 319-20 (1991); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and
the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 Supreme Court Review 373, 377.
2 494 US 872 (1990).
3 112 S Ct 2649 (1992).
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cial exemptions for religiously motivated actions. Under the doc-
trine of Lemon v Kurtzman,4 the Court construed the Establishment
Clause to forbid the government from preferring religion to non-
religion, or from subsidizing religious activities. Under the doctrine
of Sherbert v Verner, however, the Court interpreted the Free Exer-
cise Clause to require government to grant special exemptions to
those who opposed general laws on religious grounds.
5
The problem lay in the Court's attempt to enforce, simulta-
neously, broad interpretations of both clauses. When a broad read-
ing of one clause directs the government not to promote religion
and a broad reading of the other directs it not to hinder religion,
it is not possible-especially in a state where government aid and
government regulations are pervasive-to read both clauses as im-
peratives. If the government applies its laws neutrally, it will pro-
hibit some people from practicing their religion. If the government
exempts those with religious objections, it will discriminate against
those with non-religious objections. Thus a broad interpretation of
each clause is in direct conflict with a broad interpretation of the
other.
Although commentators have suggested various ways to "recon-
cile" the two clauses, there are in fact only two solutions to the
paradox: one clause or the other must be interpreted very narrowly.
The result of a narrow interpretation, however, is to subordinate
the core values of that clause to the core values of the other. Either
Establishment Clause values must be subordinated to Free Exercise
values, or Free Exercise values must be subordinated to Establish-
ment Clause values.
For two short years, the Court resolved the religion clause para-
dox by adopting the latter of these alternatives, maintaining a broad
interpretation of the Establishment Clause while narrowing its in-
terpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.6 The Court's most recent
decision in this area, however, has undone this effort at reconcilia-
tion. In Lee v Weisman the Court abandoned the last vestiges of
4 403 US 602 (1971).
374 US 398 (1963). Sometimes these exemptions took the form of taxpayer supported
subsidies and sometimes they constituted merely a discriminatory preference for religion
over non-religion, but in either case the required exemptions seemed to run afoul of the
Establishment Clause as interpreted by the Court.
6 See Employment Division v Smith, 494 US 872 (1990), discussed at pp. 150-51.
[1992
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Lemon's broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause, leaving
little or no meaning to either of the religion clauses. Although this
state of affairs may seem preferable to the incoherence of the prior
two decades, it is in fact wholly unsatisfactory when evaluated in
terms of its consistency with either the Constitution or political
theory.
I. CLAUSES IN CONFLICT
In a series of decisions beginning in 1963, the Court held
that where a neutral law of general applicability seriously compro-
mised an individual's ability to follow his religious beliefs, the Free
Exercise Clause required the government to grant an exemption
unless there was a compelling reason not to do so. Although many
claims for exemptions were rejected (especially in the waning years
of the doctrine), either because the law was found not to impinge
on religious beliefs or because the government's interest was found
to be compelling, the Court required exemptions in at least four
cases7 and approved a legislatively granted exemption in another.
Moreover, for more than a quarter century the Court never wa-
vered in its commitment to the principle of the exemption doctrine,
even if it applied it narrowly in fact.
In three decisions involving the denial of unemployment bene-
fits,8 the Court required states to pay benefits to individuals whose
inability to find work stemmed from their refusal to work in other-
wise ordinary situations that conflicted with their religious beliefs.
In each case, the Court made clear that, although any non-religious
refusal to work could result in a denial of benefits, the Free Exercise
Clause required the government to grant an exemption to those
whose objections derived from religious beliefs. Thus, for example,
a refusal to work on Saturdays due to childcare responsibilities
could result in a denial of benefits, whereas a refusal to work on
Saturdays due to religious beliefs could not. Similarly, in Wisconsin
v Yoder,9 the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause required the
' In one other case, an equally divided Court affirmed a lower court decision mandating
a religious exemption from a state law requiring photographs on drivers licenses. Jensen v
Quaring, 472 US 478 (1985), affirming .Quaring v Peterson, 728 F2d 1121 (8th Cir 1984).
8 Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398 (1963); Thomas v Review Board, 450 US 707 (1981); Hobbie
v Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 US 136 (1987).
' 406 US 205 (1972).
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state to grant an exemption from its compulsory schooling laws to
Amish parents who had religious objections to high school educa-
tion. The Court noted that the state would not be required to grant
such an exemption to a parent whose objection was "philosophical
and personal," giving the example of an isolationism derived from
Henry David Thoreau. I°
Finally, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v Amos, 11 the Court
upheld a legislatively granted exemption, embracing reasoning par-
allel to that of Yoder. In Amos, the Court upheld a provision of Title
VII that exempted religious organizations-including their secular
activities-from the general prohibition against religious discrimi-
nation. The Court held that the exemption was designed "to allevi-
ate significant governmental interference with" religious organiza-
tions, rather than to foster religion. Although the Court did not
reach the question of whether the Free Exercise Clause would have
required the exemption of its own force, the Yoder doctrine strongly
suggests that it would have.
Thus the Court construed the Free Exercise Clause, from 1963
until its 1990 decision in Smith, to require, in at least some circum-
stances, religious exemptions from neutral laws of general applica-
bility. During most of this period, however, the Court simulta-
neously interpreted the Establishment Clause to prohibit such
exemptions.
The Court first fully enunciated the interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause that guided its decisions for more than two decades
in Lemon v Kurtzman. 2 The Lemon doctrine, which was announced
in 1971 but derived from several earlier decisions, 13 prohibited any
government support of religion (financial or otherwise) unless the
government action had a secular purpose, had a primary effect that
neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and avoided "excessive
entanglement" with religion. Although inconsistently applied, es-
pecially in the area of aid to parochial schools, 14 the Lemon doctrine
10 Id at 216.
" 483 US 327 (1987).
12 403 US 602 (1971).
13 Board of Education v Allen, 392 US 236 (1968); Walz v Tax Comm'n, 397 US 664 (1970).
See Lemon, 403 US at 612-13.
14 For a list and description of the inconsistent cases, see, e.g., Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L Rev 311, 315-17 (1986).
[1992
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was uniformly acknowledged to be a broad interpretation of the
Establishment Clause which invalidated a great deal of government
support of religion.
Most important for present purposes, the Lemon doctrine logi-
cally rendered the exemptions granted in the Yoder line of cases
unconstitutional." This was so for several reasons. First, there is
no secular purpose in discriminating between religious and non-
religious reasons for individual action. The only purpose is to ac-
commodate religious beliefs, which is not a secular purpose. Sec-
ond, at its very core, Lemon prohibited the government from
preferring religion to non-religion. The exemptions established in
the Court's Free Exercise decisions mandated precisely that prefer-
ence by permitting those with religious objections, but not those
with philosophical or other non-religious objections, to avoid the
general law. Third, an effect-arguably the primary effect-of
mandating such exemptions only for those with religious claims is
to advance religion, at least in the sense of encouraging or enabling
adherents to practice their religion while denying to others the
right to live by their own philosophical principles. Thus people are
encouraged to base their lives on religious as opposed to non-
religious principles. Fourth, to the extent that such exemptions
require courts, legislatures, or administrators to determine which
acts are religiously motivated, they result in significant entangle-
ment of government with religion. Finally, at least in the unem-
ployment benefits cases, nonadherent taxpayers were required to
subsidize the religious beliefs of others. Indeed, it would seem that
a religious exemption from a general law is no more secular-and
thus no less a violation of the Establishment Clause-than an at-
tempt to include parochial schools in a general program distributing
educational maps to schoolchildren, which the Court struck down
in Meek v Pittenger,16 or a program allowing parochial and other
private schools to use state school buses, which the Court invali-
dated in Wolman v Walter.7
In fact, the Court itself occasionally recognized that Lemon pro-
hibited special exemptions for religious beliefs, and even invali-
IS See generally id at 339-40.
16 421 US 349 (1975). See also Wolman v Waiter, 433 US 229 (1977).
" 433 US 229 (1977).
HeinOnline  -- 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127 1992
128 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
dated two such exemptions. In Estate of Thornton v Caldor18 the
Court applied Lemon to strike down a state law requiring employers
to give employees their Sabbath day off, and in Texas Monthly, Inc v
Bullock19 the Court struck down a state's attempt to exempt religious
publications from its general sales tax. Thus from at least 1971
until 1990, the Court's analysis of religious exemptions from gen-
eral laws was inconsistent in both theory and practice.
Moreover, the Court's broad readings of both religion clauses
effectively enabled it to pick and choose among religions, requiring
or approving exemptions for some religions while invalidating (or
not requiring) exemptions for others. It is noteworthy that, in gen-
eral, the religions favored by the Court were marginal Christian
religions that posed little or no threat to mainstream American
Christianity. 0 The Court required or approved exemptions for the
Amish, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and Seventh-Day Ad-
ventists, all of which are long established Christian sects that have
always remained relatively small in the United States. On the other
hand, the Court consistently refused to require exemptions for
Jews, 21 non-Christian Native American religions, 22 or fundamen-
talist Christian sects (which by their aggressive evangelical tactics
and opposition to the secularization of mainstream Christianity
threaten the established religious order). 23 Thus, in addition to its
internal inconsistency, the Court's approach to the religion clauses
tended in application to accord protection primarily to those reli-
gious minorities who least need it, 21 contrary to the usual concep-
tion of the role of the Court in protecting minorities from majori-
tarian abuse.
18 472 US 703 (1985).
'9 489 US 1 (1988).
20 See Frank Way & Barbara J. Burt, Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise Clause, 77
Am Pol Sci Rev 652, 664-65 (1983). Lower court decisions may show a somewhat different
pattern.
21 See, e.g., McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420 (1961); Braunfeld v Brown, 366 US 699
(1961); Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503 (1986).
22 See Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693 (1986); Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485
US 439 (1988).
23 See Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574 (1983); Tony & Susan Alamo Founda-
tion v Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290 (1985); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v Board of Equalization,
493 US 378 (1990).
24 Cf. Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 Conn L Rev 701, 718 & n 90 (1986)
(characterizing exemptions as occurring "in largely innocuous situations").
[1992
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II. FALSE RECONCILIATIONS
Neither Lemon nor Yoder is necessarily correct, although
each reflects the core values of the clause it interprets. The Free
Exercise Clause is designed to protect the exercise of religion from
government interference. The Establishment Clause is designed to
prevent the government from putting its imprimatur behind any
one religion or religion in general.2" A broad reading of the free
exercise principle of non-interference leads to Yoder; a broad read-
ing of the establishment principle of no-imprimatur leads to Lemon
(or some similar formula prohibiting the preferential treatment of
religion). I will call these broad readings the "no interference" and
"no discrimination" principles, respectively. 26
There are four possible pairs of "pure" interpretations 27 of the
religion clauses: (1) we might interpret both clauses broadly, as the
Court did under Yoder and Lemon; (2) we might interpret both
clauses narrowly; (3) we might subordinate core Establishment
Clause values to the Free Exercise Clause by adopting only the
no-interference principle; and (4) we might subordinate the core
Free Exercise Clause values to the Establishment Clause by adopt-
ing only the no-discrimination principle. In order, the conse-
quences of these pairings for the issue of exemptions would be: (1)
exemptions are both required and prohibited; (2) exemptions are
permitted but not required; (3) exemptions are required; and (4)
exemptions are prohibited.
In adopting the first alternative, the Court created a paradox that
justices and scholars have been trying to resolve ever since. It is
25 1 believe that almost all of the scholars I discuss in this essay would agree with these
formulations in the abstract.
26 1 chose "no discrimination" instead of "no preference" because the latter is too close to
"non-preferentialism," which has become a term of art for the argument that the Establish-
ment Clause prohibits only preferential aid to some religions but does not bar aid to religion
in general over non-religion.
27 Of course, there are also what might be called "diluted" interpretations, or intermediate
approaches that blend two or more of the core interpretation pairs. Thus one might combine
a "quasi-broad" interpretation of the Establishment Clause with a "narrow but not toothless"
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. This type of intermediate approach, however,
still raises the same question: why should we allow one clause to trump the other in specific
situations? Making each clause more flexible does not reconcile the conflict, but only reduces
it to a conflict that is resolved differently in each individual case. This merely adds further
unpredictability, and does not eliminate the core conflict that requires us to subordinate one
clause to the other.
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noteworthy that every proposed reconciliation of the tension be-
tween the two clauses has adopted one of the two subordinating
solutions. Despite repeated claims that it is possible to give full
value to the core principles of both clauses without creating a direct
conflict between them, every proposed reconciliation has either
recreated the paradox or devalued one of the two clauses. The
various attempts at reconciliation fall into two broad categories: (1)
attempts to distinguish among the various types of burdens that
exemptions or failures to exempt place on nonbelievers and believ-
ers, often discussed in terms of "coercion"; and (2) attempts to
determine whether exemptions or failures to exempt constitute reli-
gious discrimination, often discussed in terms of "neutrality. 2 8 I
will deal with each in turn.
A. COERCION
A common approach taken by some proponents of a strong Free
Exercise Clause is to interpret the Establishment Clause as prohib-
iting only government coercion of religion. This approach claims
to effect a reconciliation of the two clauses. In fact, however, it
"solves" the problem by devaluing the Establishment Clause and
rendering it essentially redundant and therefore unimportant.
Jesse Choper has suggested that the Establishment Clause should
be read to forbid only government action that has both a solely
religious purpose and the likely effect of "coercing, compromising,
or influencing religious beliefs. "29 It is therefore permissible to bur-
den nonbelievers-even to impose "substantial costs" 3-in order
to relieve the burden on believers unless the non-believers' religious
liberty is itself impaired, or tax funds are used to subsidize religious
beliefs.31 Although he concludes that Sherbert was wrongly decided
28 One scholar's attempt at reconciliation simply recreates the Court's own paradox by
urging "a strong position on both [clauses]." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U Chi L Rev 195, 222 (1992).
29 Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent
Developments, 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 943, 948 (1986) ("Structural Overview"); accord, Jesse
H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U Pitt L
Rev 673, 675 (1980) ("Religion Clauses").
30 Choper, Religion Clauses at 694.
" Id at 677-80. He thus distinguishes, with little explanation, between "indirect social
costs" (permissible) and tax subsidies (impermissible), noting only that the latter, unlike the
former, "threaten the values undergirding the Establishment Clause." Id at 694.
[1992
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because other taxpayers were required to subsidize Ms. Sherbert's
religious refusal to work Saturdays,32 he approves of most other
types of exemptions as mere accommodations of religion that do
not burden the religious liberty of nonbelievers. 33
Michael McConnell appears similarly attracted to the notion of
requiring coercion for a finding of an Establishment Clause viola-
tion.3 4 In his most recent discussion of the issue, however, he sug-
gests that even the presence of coercion may not make out a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause because religious exemptions will
always "involve government coercion of some sort., 35 Thus, in
his view, exemptions may pass constitutional muster despite the
presence of coercion.
A majority of Justices have also endorsed a coercion test, al-
though they have not yet agreed on the details of its application.
In 1989 in County of Allegheny v ACLU,36 Justice Kennedy, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, would
have made coercion the "sole touchstone" of Establishment Clause
violations, "for it would be difficult indeed to establish a religion
without some measure of more of less subtle coercion." 37 All four
of these Justices agreed that placing a creche on public property
did not constitute even subtle coercion and was therefore constitu-
tional. This past term, in Lee v Weisman, 38 Justice Thomas also
endorsed a coercion test, and only a technical dispute about the
definition of coercion prevented a majority of the Court from offi-
cially adopting this standard.
Despite this lack of an explicit majority, Lee v Weisman clearly
signals the death of Lemon and the adoption of a coercion test. In
Weisman, Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-Justice majority inval-
" Id at 690-92; Choper, Structural Overview at 949.
" Choper, Religion Clauses at 685.
4 In Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 Wm & Mary L
Rev 933 (1986), he argued that only coercive governmental action violates the Establishment
Clause. More recently, however, he has suggested that a coercion test "could tend toward
acquiescence in more subtle forms of governmental power." McConnell, Religious Freedom
at a Crossroads, U Chi L Rev 115, 159 (1992) ("Crossroads"). I assume that he would approve
of an Establishment Clause test that incorporated coercion broadly defined.
35 McConnell, Crossroads at 165.
16 492 US 573 (1989).
' Id at 659, 660-61 (opinion of Kennedy).
3 112 S Ct 2649 (1992).
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idating state-sponsored prayer at a public school graduation. Justice
Scalia dissented, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Thomas. The dissenters thought coercion was a neces-
sary element of an Establishment Clause violation, and found none
on the facts of the case.
The dispute between the majority and the dissent centered on
whether the psychological coercion inherent in the graduation con-
text was sufficient to violate the Establishment Clause. Justice Ken-
nedy's majority opinion relied entirely on the coercive aspect of
the setting; he cobbled together a majority by studiously ignoring
Lemon 39 and by stating that "at a minimum, the Constitution guar-
antees that government may not coerce anyone to support or partic-
ipate in religion or its exercise. ' 4°
Although joining Justice Kennedy's opinion, the other four jus-
tices in the majority recognized that Kennedy, building upon his
opinion in Allegheny County, was prepared to substitute a coercion
test for Lemon. They therefore found it necessary to add two sepa-
rate concurring opinions emphasizing that the Establishment
Clause prohibited more than government coercion. In a concurring
opinion joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, Justice Black-
mun explained that he joined the Court's opinion only "because
[he found] nothing in it inconsistent with the essential precepts of
the Establishment Clause," adding that "[a]lthough ...proof of
government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment
Clause violation, it is sufficient."41 Justice Souter, also joined by
Justices Stevens and O'Connor, wrote separately to address the
question "whether state coercion of religious conformity, over and
above state endorsement of religious exercise or belief, is a neces-
sary element of an Establishment Clause violation."42 He concluded
39 He stated explicitly that the case did "not require [the Court] to revisit the difficult
questions dividing [it] in recent cases," and that the Court thus would "not accept the
invitation of petitioners and amicus the United States to reconsider our decision in Lemon v.
Kurtzman." Id at 2655.
'o Id. He continued that government may not "otherwise act in a way which 'establishes
a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.'" Id. This formulation adds nothing
to the coercion test. It is a mere restatement of the Establishment Clause itself, and in
Allegheny County Kennedy conflated it with the coercion test by stating that "it would be
difficult indeed to establish a religion without some measure of more or less subtle coercion."
492 US at 659.
41 112 S Ct at 2664 (Blackmun, J, concurring).
42 Id at 2667 (Souter, J, concurring).
11992
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it was not. Thus, although joining Justice Kennedy's opinion, each
of these Justices found it necessary to counter the clear implication
that government coercion is essential to a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause. Indeed, even the dissenters read Justice Kennedy's
opinion as abandoning Lemon in favor of a coercion standard.43
The Court's new coercion test is similar to the approaches recom-
mended by Choper and McConnell. In the exemption context, the
Court, after Smith, apparently will use the coercion standard to
test the constitutionality only of legislatively granted exemptions,
whereas the commentators would also use it to determine whether
exemptions that might be required by the Free Exercise Clause
are consistent with the Establishment Clause. The basic principles
urged by the commentators and adopted by the Court are similar,
however, and suffer from identical flaws.
The first flaw in the coercion test is the one identified-and put
aside-by McConnell. As long as nonbelievers are required either
to obey the offending law or, worse, to take on an additional bur-
den to enable believers to disobey (as in Amos or cases where nonbe-
liever employees must work undesirable shifts to cover for Sabbath
observers), there will be some form of government coercion.
Choper attempts to avoid this problem by suggesting that the
Establishment Clause is violated only if religious beliefs are coerced.
He defines religious beliefs to exclude all beliefs about religion
which are not themselves religiously derived (atheism, for exam-
ple).44 Michael Paulsen-who combines the no-discrimination and
coercion arguments in favor of exemptions-makes a similar argu-
ment. He maintains that there is a difference between "religion"
and "religious belief or exercise," and that "[a] nonbeliever's objec-
tion [thus] arises only when [the costs of the exemption] actually
abridge or injuriously discriminate against his freedom of nonexer-
cise."45 On this view, religious accommodation that burdens nonbe-
4 Id at 2685 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
"Although that is implicit in his general discussion of the differences between ordinary
burdens and burdens on religious liberty, he makes it explicit when he states that Epperson
v Arkansas, 393 US 97 (1968), invalidating a law prohibiting the teaching of evolution, was
wrongly decided because the law did not coerce anyone's religious beliefs. Since the law
permitted the teaching of creationism, the beliefs that were compromised were scientific,
non-religious beliefs rejecting the religious doctrine.
4s Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approacb
to Establisbnent Clause Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L Rev 311, 3 36-37 (1986) ("Religion and
Equality").
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lievers, but does not curtail their freedom not to believe, does not
violate the Establishment Clause.
This line of argument raises three parallel problems. First, under
Choper's view, the anti-evolution statute invalidated in Epperson
v Arkansas is constitutional because it does not impair religious
liberty.47 This view fails to recognize that it may impair religious
liberty for the government to suppress non-religiously derived be-
liefs that religious doctrine is erroneous-in other words, the free-
dom to believe carries with it the freedom not to believe. 48 Second,
both Choper's and Paulsen's definitions of coercion are too narrow
insofar as they fail to recognize that any government preference
for religious over non-religious beliefs will necessarily influence
religious beliefs, and thus subtly burden non-religious belief or
exercise.49 Finally, by arguing that the government may burden
some people in order to support other people's religious beliefs, as
long as it does not burden the first group's religious beliefs, the
proponents of this position single out religious beliefs from other
beliefs for special treatment. Unless they can demonstrate that reli-
gious beliefs are different from other beliefs, such a preference is
antithetical to the core values of the Establishment Clause.50 Thus,
this "reconciliation" of the tension merely subordinates the Estab-
lishment Clause to the Free Exercise Clause.
The second problem with requiring coercion as an element of an
Establishment Clause violation is that such an approach makes the
Establishment Clause redundant. Any government action that co-
erces religious belief violates the Free Exercise Clause. Although
4' 393 US 97 (1968).
'7 Choper, Religion Clauses, 41 U Pitt L Rev at 687-88 (cited in note 29).
48 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U Chi L Rev 195, 205
(1992). Paulsen, to his credit, does not fall into this trap.
49 Of course, any preference for secular over religious beliefs will have the opposite effect,
and might therefore undermine free exercise values. It is thus hard to see how any govern-
ment action in which there are religiously based differences can fail to coerce, or at least
influence, someone's religious beliefs. This is analogous to the problem with defining "neutral-
ity" in this context. See pp. 135-46. Paulsen explicitly denies that coercion is implicit in
government endorsement of religion. Although he would prohibit government coercion of
religion, he notes that "[n]either a creche nor a legislative chaplaincy abridges the religious
liberty of the nonadherent through either compulsion or inducement, and these symbolic
uses of religion do not themselves communicate a message of disapproval of such nonadher-
ence." Paulsen, Religion & Equality at 353.
50 The possibility of differentiating between religious and non-religious beliefs is discussed
more fully in the next section.
11992
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virtually all commentators (and the Court) agree that direct coer-
cion of religious beliefs violates the Free Exercise Clause, the re-
dundancy problem is especially acute for those who take an accom-
modationist approach, since they include even indirect coercion
among Free Exercise violations. As Douglas Laycock has observed,
"[c]oercion to observe someone else's religion is as much a free
exercise violation as is coercion to abandon my own."51 If all gov-
ernmental coercion concerning religious beliefs violates the Free
Exercise Clause, a coercion-based Establishment Clause does not
prohibit anything that is not independently prohibited by the Free
Exercise Clause.
The third and most obvious problem with the coercion require-
ment is that it conflicts with the plainest possible meaning of the
Establishment Clause, for it would permit Congress to establish a
church, as long as no one was required to join.52
Even if the Establishment Clause prohibits more than govern-
ment coercion, however, there is significant dispute about the ex-
tent to which it prohibits government favoritism toward religion.
This dispute takes the form of debate about discrimination and
neutrality, to which I now turn.
B. NEUTRALITY
The central problem with the neutrality solution to the issue of
religious exemptions is that, in this context, there is no such thing
as neutrality. If an exemption is granted, then the government
(whether the legislature or the Court) facially discriminates in favor
of religion, as when it exempts the Amish but not the followers of
Thoreau from compulsory schooling laws. If, on the other hand,
no exemption is granted, then the government discriminates in
effect against those with religious objections to the law, as when a
compulsory schooling law fails to exempt the Amish. Thus, as one
51 Douglas Laycock, "NonPreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent,
27 Wm & Mary L Rev 875, 922 (1986) ("A False Claim"). See also Douglas Laycock,
"Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the Establisbment Clause, 26 Valp
L Rev 37 (1991) ("Another False Claim"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democ-
racy, 59 U Chi L Rev 195 (1992); Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the
Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 997 (1986). Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Weisman makes the same point. 112 S Ct at 2672-73.
52 See Laycock, A False Claim at 39.
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scholar has noted, "the very concept of neutrality is inherently
indeterminate. "3
Most proponents of accommodation recognize this difficulty, and
counter with a call for substantive rather than formal neutralitv. 4
But unlike formal neutrality, which requires only that the govern-
ment not single out religion for special treatment, the meaning
of substantive neutrality is unclear in this context. The meaning
assigned by those who favor accommodation, however, leads to an
exceedingly narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
The major modern proponent of accommodation and a broad
Free Exercise Clause, at the expense of the Establishment Clause,
is Michael McConnell. Although his theory of the religion clauses
has developed over time-leading to several possible interpreta-
tions of his position-the core of his interpretation of the clauses
is that together they protect religious libertyss against "government-
induced homogeneity" or "uniformity."56 McConnell argues that
special exemptions for religion foster this goal because they enable
citizens to follow their individual consciences. This echoes the
Court's explanation that exemptions are permissible when (and
only when) they "alleviate significant governmental interference
with" religious beliefs and practices.5 7
Both McConnell and the Court explicitly deny that granting
exemptions discriminates against the non-religious. McConnell
suggests that secular objectors, who, under Yoder, are not granted
an exemption, "suffer little or no consequence at all" in having to
obey general laws because nonbelief "entails no obligations and no
observances."5'8 Religious beliefs are different, he argues, because
" Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illasions: Establishment Neutrality and
the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 Mich L Rev 266, 315 (1987).
5' See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DePaul L Rev 993 (1990) ("Neutrality"); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation
of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo Wash L Rev 685, 729 (1992)
("Update"); Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U Chi L Rev 1, 10-12, 33 (1989).
" Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Supreme Court Review 1 ("Ac-
commodation").
16 McConnell, Crossroads at 168, 169.
57 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop vAmos, 483 US 327, 335 (1987). See also Teras Monthly,
Inc. v Bullock, 489 US 1, 18 & n 8 (1988).
" McConnell, Accommodation, at 9, 10-11; see also Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality
Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw U L Rev 146, 152 (1986) (nonbelievers suffer only "slight
inconvenience") ("Neutrality"). He does admit that non-religious moral convictions are enti-
tled to "special respect," but not to the extent of granting exemptions. Accommodation at
11-12.
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they are "matter[s] over which we have no control-the demands
of a transcendent authority." 9 Thus there is no discrimination in
granting religious exemptions because only the religious are
harmed in this way by the law. The Court has similarly denied
that exemptions are discriminatory, suggesting in Sherbert that the
required exemption "reflects nothing more than the governmental
obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences."60 Both
the Court and McConnell therefore characterize the granting of
exemptions as a form of neutrality that implements the values of
the Free Exercise Clause without diminishing the Establishment
Clause's prohibition of discrimination in favor of religion over non-
religion.61
There are two problems with this explication of the religion
clauses. First, McConnell's initial premise seems to be that nonbe-
lievers do not suffer the same sort of harm as believers from having
to obey a law. But as William Marshall has pointed out, the di-
lemma of conflicting duties arises "anytime one's beliefs conflict
with those of the state, whether those beliefs are religious or not."62
Secularly derived beliefs may be as deeply and sincerely held as
religious beliefs. The parent who believes that it is her moral obli-
gation as a parent to spend time with her children on the weekends
because she must be away from them during the week suffers the
same consequences from having to work on Saturdays as does the
Seventh-Day Adventist who believes that her God commands her
to refrain from working on Saturday. In both cases there is a deeply
felt moral obligation imposed from without (from God or from
principles of moral rightness) and not affected by the individual's
5' McConnell, Crossroads at 172. It is interesting to compare this statement, which con-
cludes with his comment that religious beliefs, unlike secular beliefs, are not "the product
of free and voluntary choice," with his derogatory comment that the Justices tend to view
religion as the result, not of "thoughtful consideration and experience" but of "conformity
and indoctrination." Id at 122. If religious beliefs are entitled to special treatment specifically
because they are commands that must be obeyed rather than voluntary choices, then perhaps
the Justices are correct in their assessment of religion as implicating conformity and indoctri-
nation.
' Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398, 409 (1963). See also Hobble v Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 US 136, 145 n 11 (1987) (exemption "does not single out a particular class
of ... persons for favorable treatment").
61 McConnell's latest scholarship explicitly notes that discrimination in favor of religion
over non-religion is prohibited by the Establishment Clause, see McConnell, Crossroads at
175.
62 William P. Marshall, The Case Against Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemptions,
40 Case W Res L Rev 357, 383 (1989-90) ("Case Against Exemptions").
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own likes or dislikes. In both cases, the individual is placed in the
difficult position of having to choose between sacred-to her-
obligations and financial necessity.
I use the word "sacred" deliberately: it highlights the second
problem with the McConnell position. McConnell's characteriza-
tion of secular beliefs as not productive of the conflicts that result
from religious beliefs is descriptively erroneous. However, he may
instead be basing his argument-and the right to exemptions-on
a normative notion that only religious beliefs should be treated as
sacred by the government. To the extent that he is making that
claim, however, he is urging overt government discrimination in
favor of religious beliefs by "den[ying] religious and secular beliefs
equal constitutional dignity.'63 This not only undermines the heart
of the Establishment Clause by preferring religion to non-religion,
it also runs afoul of the core principles of the Free Speech Clause,
which suggest that "every idea is of equal dignity and status in the
marketplace of ideas."64
McConnell's understanding of the core purposes of the religion
clauses supports this normative reading of his argument, but also
further demonstrates that under his version of neutrality the Free
Exercise Clause will always trump the Establishment Clause. His
interpretation makes the two clauses redundant: the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits "inhibiting religious practice" and the Establish-
ment Clause prohibits "forcing or inducing a contrary religious
practice.' But anything that forces me to observe a contrary reli-
gious practice necessarily inhibits my own religious practices-
whether by forcing me to do what violates my own religious pre-
cepts, such as praying to a God I do not believe in, or by reducing
61 Id at 393. See generally id at 388-92.
64 William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U Chi L Rev
308, 320 (1991). See also Marshall, Case Against Exemptions, at 394.
65 McConnell, Crossroads at 169. To the extent that McConnell here appears to be endors-
ing coercion as a necessary element of an Establishment Clause violation, see my discussion
at pp. 13 3-35. A similar formulation of the purposes of the religion clauses has been pro-
posed by Mary Ann Glendon and Raul F. Yanes. They suggest that the "overarching
purpose [of the clauses is] to protect freedom of religion." Again, however, their definitions
make the Establishment Clause redundant: according to them, the clauses together "bar
Congress from abridging religious freedom in one specific way [the Establishment Clause],
and in general [the Free Exercise Clause]." Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural
Free Exercise, 90 Mich L Rev 477, 541 (1991). Moreover, unlike McConnell, they would not
require neutrality between religion and non-religion, id at 539, and thus would further
minimize the Establishment Clause.
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the time and money I have available to support my own religion.
Similarly, McConnell's understanding eliminates any independent
meaning for the Establishment Clause: "Taken together, the Reli-
gion Clauses can be read most plausibly as warding off two equal
and opposite threats to religious freedom-government action that
promotes the majority's favored brand of religion and government
action that impedes religious practices not favored by the major-
ity."'66 McConnell obviously believes that these are two distinct
threats, but it is not clear how any government action could pro-
mote one religion without simultaneously impeding others. This is
especially problematic for those who, like McConnell, find that
even indirect and unintentional inhibitions on religious practices
violate the Free Exercise Clause. Thus every Establishment Clause
violation is also a Free Exercise violation (although not vice versa),
and the definitions render the Establishment Clause a nullity.
The crux of the problem with McConnell's interpretation of the
religion clauses is that it fails to recognize the shades of meaning
that might be comprehended by such terms as "inhibiting," "forc-
ing," "promot[ing]," and "imped[ing]." Like "neutrality," these
terms can refer either to government action that intentionally or
facially favors or disfavors religious over non-religious practices, or
it can refer to the actual or perceived effect of the government
action. An atheist might reasonably believe that the government is
forcing or promoting deism (or religion in general) when it accom-
modates those whose objection to obeying the law stems from reli-
gion but not those whose objection stems from secular beliefs, just
as a believer is convinced that the government is inhibiting religion
if it fails to grant an exemption. But McConnell's scheme leaves
room only for the believer's objection and not for the atheist's; he
does not consider accommodation as promoting religion.
McConnell's failure to recognize the atheist's claim as valid stems
from his disparate treatment of religious and secular beliefs.
McConnell accepts without question perceptions derived from reli-
gious beliefs, but rejects perceptions derived from contrary beliefs.
For example, the eternal consequences of obeying a law in conflict
with religious beliefs are all in the believer's mind (there are no
tangible consequences that can be perceived by an objective ob-
server). McConnell nevertheless counts as a cost the non-tangible
McConnell, Update at 690.
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harm that derives from ignoring those idiosyncratic and non-
verifiable beliefs. On the other hand, McConnell "rules out of
bounds costs consisting solely of aversions toward religion or par-
ticular faiths."67 In other words, if I believe that I will be eternally
damned if I work on Saturday, for the government to force me to
do so imposes a cost on me. If, by contrast, I believe that religion
condemns humanity to a stunted and uncreative future, for the
government to foster religion by preferring your religious to my
secular motivations in allocating benefits imposes no cost on me.
In either case, however, there is neither a way to verify the belief-
that I will be damned or that humanity will be stunted-nor any
objective way to reckon the cost to me if the government acts in a
way inconsistent with beliefs.68
The differentiation between religious and nonreligious beliefs
thus plays a key role in McConnell's theories of accommodation.
That distinction underlies the normative decision to treat only reli-
gious beliefs as worthy of special protection and also defines the
sorts of non-tangible effects that will count for purposes of measur-
ing discriminatory effects.
In order to explain and justify such differential treatment of
religious and non-religious beliefs, McConnell must demonstrate
that they are different in a relevant, if not compelling, way. Apart
from the unsupported assertion that religious beliefs, unlike secular
beliefs, are commands, and the oft-repeated observation that the
Constitution singles out religion for special treatment, 69 no one has
distinguished religious from non-religious beliefs in such a way as
to justify the discrimination inherent in preferring religious beliefs.
That the Constitution singles out religion is not itself persuasive,
for it singles out religion for both preferential and disadvantageous
67 McConnell & Posner, 56 U Chi L Rev at 35 (cited in note 54).
' One might try to label the costs to the religious believer as "Hohfeldian" and those to
the nonbeliever as "non-Hohfeldian," but that characterization depends on a prior assump-
tion that the nonbeliever's interest in humanity's future is different from the believer's
interest in his own afterlife. Needless to say, that very distinction also depends on the beliefs
of the two individuals, and may vary (some believers may be more concerned about human-
ity than about themselves, for example). Thus reckoning the cost, and differentiating be-
tween costs, ultimately depends on how one treats the individual's own beliefs.
69 See, e.g., McConnell, Update at 717; Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise,
1990 Supreme Court Review 1, 16; Paulsen, 61 Notre Dame L Rev at 337 (cited in note
45).
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treatment: the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clauses to-
gether bar the government not only from interfering with individ-
ual religious beliefs but also from favoring them.7" This is unlike
the Free Speech Clause, for example, which does not bar the gov-
ernment from speaking itself.7 ' The most intriguing attempt to
explain how religious beliefs are unique is John Garvey's. He sug-
gests that "religion is a lot like insanity" in that true believers may
be unable to perceive reality the way others do and may thus be
unable to conform their conduct to the law in light of their percep-
tion that God commands them to do otherwise.72 This hardly
serves as a justification for requiring the government to cater to
what would, in the insane, be called delusions. Thus, no attempt
to distinguish religious from non-religious beliefs has successfully
justified granting exemptions to religious objectors but not to secu-
lar objectors.
Thus McConnell-and the Court in its rare attempts to explain
away the tension between its establishment and free exercise juris-
prudence-achieves a resolution between the two clauses only by
making the Establishment Clause virtually meaningless, at least in
the context of exemptions that privilege religious objectors over
secular objectors. In McConnell's view, the Establishment Clause
prohibits the government from giving money to "religion qua reli-
7' The argument that the Founders must have thought religion was different-otherwise
they would not have adopted the religion clauses-does not get us very far. First, it is
possible to read the Free Exercise Clause as a particularized version of the Free Speech
Clause, guaranteeing only that the government could not suppress religious belief or expres-
sion any more than it could suppress political expression. For an elaboration of this argu-
ment, see Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special? Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion
Under the Religion Clauses of tbe First Amendment, 52 U Pitt L Rev 75, 148 (1990). The
Establishment Clause might then be read as a way of ensuring that religion would not be
treated differently. Second, even if the founding generation believed that religion was differ-
ent and therefore entitled to special consideration (and the best reading of the history, as
with most such disputes, is probably that some did and some didn't), their intent might
be incoherent in a modem regulated state. Finally, basing modem interpretations of the
Constitution on the specific intent of the framers is controversial, to say the least.
71 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Weisman recognized this difference in the context
of government speech about religion. 112 S Ct at 2657-58. See also Sullivan, 59 U Chi L
Rev at 206 (cited in note 51) ("there is no political establishment clause").
72 John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 Conn L Rev 779,
798-800 (1986). If that is in fact an accurate account of the difference between religious and
non-religious beliefs, one should also note that the insane who commit crimes may not be
punished but are nevertheless locked up until they give up their delusions. They are cer-
tainly not given carte blanche to disobey whatever law their delusions made them unable
to obey.
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gion,"" but does not prohibit the government from subsidizing
Ms. Sherbert's religious beliefs or granting a sales tax exemption
only to religious publications.74 McConnell's Establishment Clause
would prohibit little beyond direct discrimination among faiths or
legislative declarations that everyone must tithe or attend church-
rather remote legislative possibilities.7" McConnell comments that
the difference between substantive and formal neutrality "is the
difference between a Free Exercise Clause that is a major re-
straining device on government action . . . and a Free Exercise
Clause that will rarely have practical application."76 That is true.
But McConnell's position reduces the Establishment Clause to just
such a practical nullity.
Other scholars similarly reconcile the two clauses-and label
their reconciliation "neutrality"-by elevating the core values of
the Free Exercise Clause over those of the Establishment Clause.
Douglas Laycock advocates "substantive neutrality": the govern-
ment should "minimize the extent to which it either encourages or
discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice,
observance or nonobservance."77 According to Laycock, although
no government act in this context can be wholly neutral, we can
distinguish between the minor encouragement of religion that oc-
curs when an exemption is granted and the severe discouragement
of religion that occurs when an exemption is denied. He offers
as illustration the question whether to grant an exemption from
Prohibition for the religious use of wine. 78
What Laycock, like McConnell, fails to appreciate is that when-
ever government attempts to remedy a de facto discrimination
against religion by granting an exemption to religious objectors it
7 McConnell, Crossroads at 185.
4 He suggests that his approach would mandate a judicial return to the Sberbert-Yoder
regime, "albeit with more vigorous and consistent enforcement," McConnell, Crossroads at
170, and nowhere suggests that any legislatively granted exemption is unconstitutional.
" McConnell does suggest that it might violate the Establishment Clause if the govern-
ment influenced or subtly coerced a captive or vulnerable audience into conformity with
government-preferred religious beliefs. See Crossroads at 158. Such coercion, however, would
probably also violate the Free Exercise Clause since the coercion would operate to impede
the audience's adherence to its own religious beliefs as well. The redundancy created by
using a coercion test is discussed at pages 134-35.
" McConnell, Update at 689.
77 Laycock, Remnants, 1990 Supreme Court Review at 16.
78 Laycock, Neutrality, 39 DePaul L Rev at 1000-1003.
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creates an equally noxious de jure discrimination against nonbeliev-
ers. For the government to grant only religious exemptions sends
a message that religious belief is valued more than nonbelief (or
non-religious belief)" and encourages religious belief. The fact
that, as Laycock points out, it does not directly encourage religious
belief8" (most parents are not about to become Amish in order to
avoid compulsory schooling laws) does not change the fact that the
message is there. As Laycock himself observes, 83 percent of the
American public claims to feel "close to God,"'" and any govern-
ment preference for religiously derived values over secularly de-
rived values can only compound the pressure nonbelievers experi-
ence when they are reminded that America is a religious nation.
How one evaluates the magnitude of the effect-whether it is mi-
nor or severe-depends on how one values the intangible, nonfalsi-
fiable beliefs of both the religious and the non-religious. The harm
done to believers who are prevented from practicing their religion
is no different in kind or degree from the harm done to nonbelievers
(in particular to atheists and others who subscribe to secular rather
than religious worldviews) who are branded as unwelcome second-
class citizens and implicitly informed that they will be welcome if
only they will embrace the right beliefs. One's own perspective
determines both which harm is considered greater and which prin-
ciple-no-discrimination or no-interference-has priority. An un-
sympathetic atheist may scoff just as much at the believer's claim
of religious compulsion as the believer may scoff at the atheist's
sense of exclusion. Each may say, with equal justification, that the
other suffers no real or tangible injury. Only by distinguishing
religious beliefs from other beliefs (including non-religiously de-
rived beliefs about religion) can Laycock distinguish the two harms.
Ira Lupu also champions a form of "neutrality," which he labels
the pursuit of "equal religious liberty."8 2 Under his scheme, how-
" Mark Tushnet, who has wavered between advocating formal neutrality and advocating
substantive neutrality, has made the same observation. Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle
of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 Geo L J 1691, 1703 (1988) ("Dubitante").
0 Laycock, Remnants at 17.
8 Douglas Laycock, Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8 Const Comm 395, 397 (1991).
82 Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accom-
modation of Religion, 140 U Pa L Rev 555, 567-68 (1991) ("Reconstructing the Establishment
Clause"); Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution,
18 Conn L Rev 739 (1986) ("Keeping the Faith").
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ever, the government is permitted to aid religion along with non-
religion in some cases, and is required to aid religion alone in
others.83 Lupu, like McConnell and Laycock, recognizes the bur-
den formal neutrality (no facial discrimination for or against reli-
gion) can place on religious believers, and rectifies it in the same
way: by allowing facial discrimination in favor of religion where it
is necessary to relieve the discriminatory effect on believers. Again,
however, he fails to appreciate that this does not resolve the con-
flict, but simply shifts the burden of discriminatory effects from
believers to nonbelievers. Moreover, to the extent that he interprets
the Free Exercise Clause to protect religious liberty and the Estab-
lishment Clause to protect equal religious liberty,8 4 the Establish-
ment Clause appears to add nothing to what is already protected
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 85
Mark Tushnet once suggested86 a "reconciliation" that, while not
explicitly couched in terms of "neutrality," suffers from the same
flaws. He formulated a seemingly simple resolution of the tension
between the two clauses, at least in the area of religious exemptions:
"[o]ne could .. . interpret the establishment clause to prohibit all
statutes that have a religious purpose, except for statutes with the
purpose of accommodating religion in ways required by the free
exercise clause."87 Thus the breadth of the Free Exercise Clause is
matched by a narrowing of the Establishment Clause. But there is
no way to explain why this formulation is better than its opposite:
interpret the Free Exercise Clause to require only those religions
83 Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause at 588-89, 594-95. See also Paulsen, Religion
& Equality at 314, 354-56 (cited in note 45). Paulsen, like Lupu, suggests that the religion
clauses together protect "equality of religious freedom," mandating "neutrality." Id at 314,
332.
84 Lupu, Keeping the Faith at 742.
85 The fact that the Establishment Clause predates the Equal Protection Clause by more
than half a century-and predates the modern interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
by which religious minorities are protected from discrimination by almost two centuries-
might matter only to hardcore originalists. What most courts and scholars are struggling with
today is not the original meaning of the Constitution, but the modem meaning. Moreover, as
suggested at pp. 147-48, the founders' original intent may be incoherent in the context of
today's activist state.
" He has apparently since abandoned that position and moved into the "formal neutrality"
camp. See Tushnet, Dubitante (cited in note 76); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 Supreme Court Review 373.
87 Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses,
27 Wm & Mary L Rev 997, 1007 (1986). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Constitutionally
Compelled Ex'emptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 985, 994 (1986).
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exemptions not prohibited by the Establishment Clause, and then
interpret the Establishment Clause broadly. Similarly, Michael
Paulsen suggests that "protecting the constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion" should constitute a compelling governmental
interest sufficient to withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny.
8 8
This formulation can also be reversed: protecting the values of the
Establishment Clause should constitute a compelling government
interest sufficient to justify the impact of neutral laws on religious
exercise. Whichever clause serves as the compelling interest trumps
the other. Which formulation one prefers depends solely on
whether one places a higher priority on the values of the Establish-
ment Clause or on those of the Free Exercise Clause.
If some alleged reconciliations of the religion clauses achieve
their goal by subordinating the Establishment Clause, others make
the opposite mistake. Those who oppose exemptions for believers
often fail to see that neutral laws, rigidly applied, constitute a form
of discrimination against believers, contrary to the values of the
Free Exercise Clause. These scholars' "reconciliations" simply in-
terpret the Free Exercise Clause narrowly, thus subordinating its
core values to those of the Establishment Clause.
Philip Kurland is perhaps the strongest proponent of the rule
against exemptions. Calling for neutrality, he suggests not only
that courts should not grant religious exemptions (i.e., Yoder was
wrongly decided), but also that legislatures should be prohibited
from granting such exemptions (i.e., Amos was wrongly decided)., 9
Although his scheme achieves formal neutrality, it effectively privi-
leges Establishment Clause values over Free Exercise Clause values
by upholding laws that have a severe discriminatory effect on reli-
gious believers. Just as one interpretation of the Establishment
Clause prohibits the government from discriminating-facially or
in effect-against nonbelievers, one interpretation of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause protects believers from the discriminatory effect of
neutral laws. Kurland does not satisfactorily take into account this
possible reading of the Free Exercise Clause. Thus just as McCon-
nell and others undervalue the discrimination inflicted by exemp-
Paulsen, Religion & Equality at 341-42 (cited in note 45).
See Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of tbe First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 Viii L Rev 3 (1978-79); Philip B. Kurland, Religion and
the Law (1962).
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tions, Kurland undervalues the discrimination-eloquently de-
scribed by McConnell and others9°-inflicted by neutral laws.
William Marshall also opposes exemptions for religious objec-
tors, but only those that have been imposed by judicial interpreta-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause. He apparently would uphold
legislatively granted exemptions.9' Because this is the approach that
seems to command a majority of the current Court, I will engage
in a fuller discussion of this position later.92 For now, it is sufficient
to note that although Marshall recognizes that a failure to grant
exemptions may have a discriminatory impact on believers, 93 he
nonetheless concludes that such de facto discrimination is prefera-
ble to the harm caused by granting exemptions.94 Thus, unlike
McConnell or Kurland, Marshall acknowledges that his solution
requires at least some subordination of one religion clause to the
other.
Scholars have also made parallel arguments on each side ques-
tioning the very framing of the question as one of "discrimination."
McConnell has suggested that the Free Exercise Clause provides
not only protection against religious discrimination, but also a sub-
stantive right to religious liberty. 9 He can therefore argue that the
real evil of a generally applicable law is not its discriminatory effect
90 Laycock's characterization of the Court's view of what it accomplished by not granting
exemptions is perhaps the most telling. He notes that the Court believes that "religious
minorities will give up their faith without a fuss if the law says they must." Laycock,
Remnants at 29. In fact, as Laycock points out, for some believers this is incorrect. Although
Laycock is surely right as far as he goes, it is probably also incorrect to assume that all
secular objectors-especially those whose objections are principled and morally, politically,
or philosophically based-will give up their beliefs easily. The many secular objectors to
draft laws and Jim Crow laws who went to jail rather than obey are evidence that religious
believers do not have a monopoly on martyrdom.
9' Marshall, In Defense of Smith (cited in note 64).
92 See Part III.
9' Id at 318.
94 Id at 318-19.
9' Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U Chi L Rev
1109, 1137 (1990). Even this formulation may not lead McConnell where he wants to go.
It is not so clear that a law that unintentionally and indirectly infringes a constitutionally
protected right is unconstitutional. For example, a law that indirectly (and purportedly
unintentionally) infringes freedom of speech is not tested by strict scrutiny but by a less
rigorous standard. See, e.g., US v O'Brien, 391 US 367 (1968). Similarly, refusing to fund
abortion-analogous to refusing to exempt religious practices from general laws-does not
violate the constitutional right to abortion, Harris v McRae, 448 US 297 (2980), even though
it may have a detrimental effect on individual exercise of the underlying constitutional right.
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on religious objectors but its infringement of their right to practice
their religion. A similar gambit also can be made on the other side,
however. Kathleen Sullivan has suggested that the Establishment
Clause creates an analogous substantive right: the right to a "civil
order for the resolution of public moral disputes."96 Thus, whereas
McConnell claims that religious adherents have a right to practice
their religion, Sullivan claims that non-adherents have a right to a
secular government. This merely reframes the discrimination issue
in terms of conflicting substantive rights: any governmental accom-
modation of the right to practice one's religion necessarily infringes
the right to a secular government (and vice versa).
These parallel recharacterizations yield an important observa-
tion. The gist of my argument is that it is not possible simulta-
neously to implement the core values of both religion clauses. By
framing the question in terms of substantive rights, McConnell and
Sullivan highlight an issue underlying the work of all the scholars
I have discussed: what is the "true meaning" of the religion clauses?
In response to my arguments, McConnell can claim that a narrow
(or redundant) reading of the Establishment Clause is correct; Kur-
land, on the other hand, can claim that a narrow (or redundant)
reading of the Free Exercise Clause is correct. Unfortunately, in
their haste to reconcile the two clauses without subordinating ei-
ther, neither they nor anyone else has seriously justified the choice
of which clause to interpret narrowly -and which to interpret
broadly.
McConnell has argued that the founding generation intended a
narrow reading of the Establishment Clause.97 But beyond being
subject to all the objections to originalism generally,98 McConnell's
history is itself controversial in its details." Moreover, it is at least
plausible that the founding generation intended broad readings of
both clauses, without realizing that in our highly regulated and
' Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U Chi L Rev 195, 197 (1992).
9' Michael W. McConnell, The Ongins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 Harv L Rev 1409 (1990).
' See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
Ohio St LJ 1085 (1989).
' Compare Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 Wm &
Mary L Rev 933 (1986), with Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another
False Claim about the Establishment Clause, 26 Valp U L Rev 37 (1991); and Lee v Weisman,
112 S Ct at 2672-76 (Souter, J, concurring).
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subsidized society the two would often conflict. 0 0 Thus, religious
believers in an era of truly limited government could quite reason-
ably press for the adoption of both clauses, in order to keep govern-
ment from interfering with religious belief either positively or nega-
tively, without foreseeing that one day a government policy that
kept its distance from religion by not singling it out for special
treatment in either direction might itself constitute an interference
with religion.
Laycock has suggested an alternative justification for his pre-
ferred reading of the clauses. He says it would be "implausible" to
adopt a reading of the Free Exercise Clause that would allow (or
require) government to prohibit the religious use of wine if it pro-
hibited alcohol consumption generally."'0 It is not implausible from
a historical perspective, as the founding generation had no idea that
government might be so involved in the lives of the people as to
prohibit ordinary, everyday practices that affect religion. Advo-
cates of the religion clauses feared deliberate persecution, not un-
foreseen general government growth with a negative impact on
religion.'02 And it is only implausible from a practical perspective
if one values religious celebrations more than non-religious ones-
bringing us back to the issues of perspective and differentiation.
The main purpose of this essay is to suggest that what is needed
is a persuasive justification for preferring one clause to the other.
Rather than denying the subordinating effects of their "reconcilia-
c Robert Bork has made a similar observation about the Equal Protection Clause, sug-
gesting that the Reconstruction architects' simultaneous desire for equality and for segrega-
tion made sense to them but cannot be implemented today. Robert Bork, The Tempting of
America: The Political Seduction of the Law 74-84 (Macmillan 1990).
151 Laycock, Neutrality at i000-1001 (cited in note 54).
102 McConnell bases his contrary historical conclusion on weak evidence. For example, he
interprets Madison's original draft prohibiting the infringement of rights of conscience "on
any pretext" as prohibiting infringement "for any reason," including unintentionally.
McConnell, Update at 691 n 25 (cited in note 54). The more usual reading of "pretext,"
however, suggests an intentional act with a disguised motivation. Madison was guarding
against intentional discrimination disguised as neutrality, not truly general laws enacted for
nondiscriminatory reasons. The normal meaning of "pretext" is apparent in John Marshall's
use of the term some years later in McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 423 (1819).
There is also some evidence that those who drafted the Bill of Rights specifically did not
intend to require accommodation. Egbert Benson of New York, for example, moved to
strike language requiring a military exemption for conscientious objectors on the ground
that "[n]o man can claim this indulgence of right. It may be a religious persuasion, but it is
no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the Government." 1
Annals of Cong. 751 (Joseph Gales ed., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834) (Aug. 17, 1789).
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tions," religion clause scholars might more constructively recognize
the problem and attempt more forthrightly to justify their prefer-
ences for one clause over the other. What purposes does religion
serve in a modern democracy, and how should we best foster those
goals? Much of modern constitutional scholarship in other areas
has focused on similar questions, but religion clause jurisprudence
has been mired in attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable. The
time has come to admit the conflict and to make an honest choice. 103
Whether the issue is coercion or discrimination, we cannot es-
cape the conclusion that anything we do with regard to exemptions
harms someone in a constitutionally significant way. The scholars
who subordinate the Free Exercise Clause recognize what McCon-
nell and others overlook: that granting an exemption sends a mes-
sage of endorsement of religious over secular beliefs and relegates
nonbelievers to the status of outsiders. Ironically, those very same
scholars fail to recognize that the failure to exempt religious believ-
ers from regulations that indirectly but severely burden religious
practice has a similar effect on believers, relegating them to the
status of outsiders whose fundamental beliefs are not respected by
103 Justice Blackmun has suggested a different "reconciliation" that deserves brief com-
ment. In Bullock, he suggested that while a special tax exemption for religious publications
violated the Establishment Clause, failure to exempt such publications might violate the
Free Exercise Clause. He proposed that perhaps the Court should therefore require the state
to broaden its exemption to include secular literature devoted to similarly philosophical
questions. 489 US at 27-28.
Blackmun's approach is similar to the approach taken in other discriminatory effect con-
texts. The usual rule under Title VII, for example, is that where a particular employment
practice has a discriminatory effect on a protected group, the employer is prohibited from
applying the practice either to that group or to any similarly situated non-minority em-
ployees.
Unfortunately, any attempt to implement such an approach in the religion context would
be highly impractical. The Court has used this approach in determining the scope of consci-
entious objector status, concluding that such status must be granted to anyone whose objec-
tion to military service is equivalent to a religious objection. See Welsh v United States, 398
US 333 (1970); United States v Seeger, 380 US 163 (1965). The case-by-case determination
required by that rule, however, severely reduced the efficiency of the selective service
process, and the whole process ultimately favored primarily upper middle class whites. See,
e.g., Lawrence M. Baskir & William A. Strauss, Chance and Circunistance: The Draft, the War
and the Vietnam Generation 7-9, 41-42 (Knopf 1978). To extend such a process to every claim
of objection to ordinary laws would be likely to affect both efficiency and neutrality in the
same way but on a more massive scale.
Moreover, if any serious (non-frivolous) objection to a law led the courts to require a
compelling interest in the law, either many laws would be invalidated or the compelling
interest test would be drastically diluted. That dilution would in turn probably affect the
application of strict scrutiny in other constitutional contexts.
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the majority. The choice between these alternatives is not easy,
but we cannot make it disappear by denying the hardship that each
alternative causes.
III. THE COURT'S RESOLUrION: PARADOX REDUX
In 1990, the Court finally resolved the paradox in one of
the two possible ways. In Employment Division v Smith,"° it aban-
doned the Yoder-Sherbert line of cases (confining them to their facts)
and announced that henceforth religious objectors had the same
obligation to obey neutral laws as everyone else. Assuming that
Lemon would still govern establishment cases, Smith's repudiation
of the exemption doctrine yielded a consistent jurisprudence that
coupled a narrow interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause with
a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Although im-
mediately attacked by most commentators,' Smith was the first
glimmer of coherence in the Court's religion clause jurisprudence
in twenty years.
As I have argued, there were only two ways for the Court to
resolve the tension created by its broad interpretation of both the
religion clauses-either to narrow its construction of the Establish-
ment Clause or to narrow its view of the Free Exercise Clause.
Although some might quarrel with the Court's decision to choose
the latter course, one or the other was necessary. Which course
one prefers depends on which clause one thinks more important, 10 6
but the burden of my argument has been to show that one of
these two choices was essential. Despite the many failed efforts at
"reconciliation," no one has yet persuasively justified choosing one
'04 494 US 872 (1990). The result in Smith was presaged in a series of cases in which the
Court seriously watered down the Yoder test in order to deny exemptions in a variety of
situations, see, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v Board of Equalization, 493 US 378 (1990);
Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 US 439 (1988); Tony & Susan Alamo Founda-
tion v Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290 (1985), or interpreted legislatively granted exemptions
so narrowly as to render them almost trivial, see, e.g., Ansonia Board of Education v Philbrook,
479 US 60 (1986).
105 See, e.g., sources cited in Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clanse, 140 U Pa L Rev
at 561 n 13.
06 This is not to say that it is necessarily a matter of pure personal preference, of course.
Different theoretical approaches to constitutional analysis would yield different answers to
the question of which clause is more important. My point in the text is that since scholars
seem to have concentrated largely on "reconciling" the two clauses, there is little or no
scholarship considering why one clause or the other ought to be deemed superior.
[1992
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clause over the other, and only such an argument could meaning-
fully defend or criticize Smith on its merits. In the absence of any
persuasive reason to prefer one clause over the other, Smith remains
defensible as one of two equally valid positions, and one that is
clearly more coherent than the hopelessly conflicted prior state of
affairs.
Although it resolved the paradox, however, Smith contained the
seeds of an equally problematic conflict, which came to fruition
only two years later in Lee v Weisman. Although the Court in Smith
held that exemptions for religious objectors are not constitutionally
required, it also suggested that such exemptions are not prohibited
if a legislature chooses to grant them. Thus, at the same time that
the Court narrowed its interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause,
it intimated that it was on the verge of narrowing its interpretation
of the Establishment Clause as well. In Lee v Weisman it did just
that, unofficially abandoning Lemon for its much narrower coercion
test. 107
Thus, the brief but coherent reign of a narrow free exercise
jurisprudence and a broad establishment jurisprudence was almost
immediately replaced by narrow interpretations of both clauses. In
the context of exemptions, this means that exemptions are routinely
permitted, but never constitutionally required. In its own way,
this creates a paradox as puzzling as-and more troubling than-its
predecessor.
The problem with the Court's current interpretation is that it
leaves both clauses without substantive content, for no apparent
reason. No theory of the underlying values of the religion clauses-
whether neutrality, benevolence, or separationism-justifies a
scheme in which the government is permitted but not required to
grant exemptions.1 8 Permitting the legislature broad leeway to
grant exemptions suggests that the purpose of the religion clauses
107 In particular, it is clear that exemptions will be permitted even though they are not
required. Even Justice Souter, who with Justices Stevens and O'Connor rejected the coer-
cion test in favor of an "endorsement" test, thought legislative accommodation of religious
practices would be permissible. Lee v Weisman, 112 S Ct at 2676-77 (Souter, J, concurring).
"' Mark Tushnet has argued that the "disarray" of the religion clauses stems from our
abandonment of our republican heritage in favor of a purely liberal world. Mark V. Tushnet,
Red, Wbite andBlue: A Gritical Analysis of Constitutional Law 247-76 (Harvard 1988). Although
he wrote before either Smith or Weisman, his explanation could apply equally well to today's
religion clauses.
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is, as McConnell suggests, to protect and nurture individual reli-
gious beliefs in the face of governmental pressure to conform, thus
elevating free exercise values. But if that is the case, the clauses
should also be read to require exemptions in circumstances where
the pressure to conform is great and the need for conformity is
minimal. Similarly, if-as the holding in Smith seems to suggest-
the purpose of the religion clauses is to allow a secular government
to operate independent of the varied religious beliefs of the citi-
zenry, thus elevating Establishment Clause values, then accommo-
dation of religion at the expense of non-religion must be forbidden
in order to preserve that independence. For the Court generally to
permit but not to require exemptions achieves no goal that can
be explained by reference to any possible purpose of the religion
clauses.
Moreover, the practical result of simultaneously narrow interpre-
tations of both clauses is even worse than the result of the earlier
conflict caused by the Court's broad interpretation of both clauses.
Recall that under the Yoder-Lemon scheme the Court was effectively
empowered to choose among religions, deciding which deserved
exemptions and which did not. Under the current scheme, that
same unfettered discretion is accorded the legislature. All religious
accommodation is now "a matter of political discretion, rather than
a matter of constitutional right."' 9 The decision whether to grant
or withhold exemptions will now reflect the religious preference of
the majority, thus compounding the "bias in favor of mainstream
over non-mainstream religions."...0 As a general rule, courts will be
more evenhanded than legislatures, since they are "sworn to do
equal justice to all . . . and to treat like cases alike." Legislatures,
on the other hand, "are [constitutionally] free to reflect majority
prejudices, to respond to the squeakiest wheel among minorities,
to trade votes and make compromises, and to ignore problems that
have no votes in them."' n
This is the worst of all possible "solutions," for neither equal
accommodation of religion nor equal indifference to religion is
109 Lupu, Reconstructing the Establisbment Clause, 140 U Pa L Rev at 573 (cited in note 82).
"10 McConnell, Crossroads at 139 (cited in note 34). See also Mark Tushner, "Of Church and
State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 Supreme Court Review 373, 386-87.
... Laycock, Remnants, 1990 Supreme Court Review at 15 (cited in note 69). See also Lupu,
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, 140 U Pa L Rev at 600-606 (cited in note 82).
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mandated. Instead, an unrestrained majority is authorized to in-
dulge its discriminatory preferences. 2 Despite the breadth of solu-
tions offered by the various scholars discussed in this article, those
scholars are almost unanimous in their condemnation of this partic-
ular scheme.113 It is both tragic and ironic that the Court has moved
toward a construction of the religion clauses that serves none of
the possible underlying goals of First Amendment and that replaces
a regime that encourages judicial incoherence with one that encour-
ages legislative intolerance.
1 Even McConnell appears to concede that Smitb's abandonment of required exemptions
would be better paired with a broad Establishment Clause-which at least would strike
down discriminatory accommodations by the legislature-than with a narrow one. McCon-
nell, Free Exercise Revisionism, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1132 (cited in note 95). McConnell may
have revised his position, as he has more recently suggested that legislatures are competent
to make accommodation choices. McConnell, Update at 722-26 (cited in note 54).
'"3 The only exception appears to be William Marshall, who applauds the Court's adoption
of a rule of permissive but not required exemptions. See Marshall, In Defense of Smith, espec.
p. 323 (cited in note 64). Marshall's main thrust in this short article, however, is to defend
the more narrow holding of Smith-that exemptions are not required by the Free Exercise
Clause-and his discussion of permissive exemptions focuses primarily 9n how they are
constitutionally distinguishable from mandatory exemptions. Thus he offers no real defense
of the general scheme of permitting but not requiring exemptions.
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